Why the Constitutional Court’s ruling in the Paderin case goes far beyond the dispute over student expulsion

In my view, the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated March 11, 2026, in the case regarding the constitutional complaint filed by Volodymyr Paderin concerning the constitutionality of paragraph 5 of part one of Article 46 of the Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education” falls precisely into this category.

The Court found the contested provision to be constitutional, but at the same time explicitly noted that in the specific case, the appellate court had interpreted it in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine.

The main significance of the decision lies in this restrained yet conceptually strong reasoning. The Court did not overturn the legislative provision, but set a clear limit on its unconstitutional application. And this is one form of constitutional review.

Not about discipline as such

At first glance, the facts of the case appear narrow. The law provides for the possibility of expelling a higher education student in the event of a breach of the terms of the study agreement.

In the Paderin case, this provision was applied in connection with the university’s reference to violations of academic discipline, internal rules, regulations regarding the student dormitory, and related internal regulations.

However, behind this case lay a question of much broader scope: can the constitutional right to higher education effectively be made contingent upon related, derivative, or everyday organizational legal relationships?

In other words, is it permissible for a sanction arising within the realm of internal order to be automatically transferred to another realm—one where the issue is no longer merely a disciplinary response, but a person’s access to a right guaranteed by the Constitution?

That is precisely why this case is far more significant than a typical conflict between a student and a higher education institution.

It concerns a question fundamental to all public authority: where does an institution’s discretion end and the duty to respect the essence of human rights begin?

The Court did not overturn the provision—the Court defined the boundary

The Constitutional Court did not take the path of symbolic radicalism. It did not declare the disputed provision unconstitutional.

Instead, the Court did what, in a mature constitutional system, often carries even greater weight than repealing a provision: it defined the limits of its constitutionally permissible application.

This is a fundamental point, because not every intervention by the Constitutional Court must take the form of removing a provision from the legal framework.

In many cases, the true function of constitutional review lies precisely in preventing the application of a law from becoming a means of restricting rights.

Thus, in the Paderin case, the Court left the law in force but did not allow it to be used as a tool for excessive interference with the content of the right to higher education. It is precisely in this that the legal maturity of such an approach is manifested.

A treaty cannot supersede the Constitution

One of the most important conclusions arising from this decision is that a contract cannot supersede the Constitution.

The existence of a contract for education does not mean that the right to higher education loses its public-law character and is reduced to a mere set of mutual obligations between the student and the university.

In this legal relationship, the student is not merely a party to the contract. He or she is the holder of a constitutional right guaranteed by Article 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

Thus, no contractual provision, no internal condition, and no administrative practice may be interpreted in a way that effectively nullifies the substance of the right itself. This is one of the key ideas of the decision: the right to education does not disappear simply because it is realized in an organizational or contractual form.

University autonomy has its limits

Equally important is that the Constitutional Court did not deny the significance of university autonomy. And this lends the decision greater persuasiveness. For a university truly cannot exist without rules, internal order, academic discipline, ethical standards, and requirements for coexistence.

The autonomy of a higher education institution is a necessary condition for the quality of the educational process. However, in a constitutional state, institutional autonomy is not absolute. It cannot serve as a license for any decision and cannot supersede constitutional guarantees. Its limits lie where disproportionate interference with a fundamental right begins.

That is precisely why one of the strongest legal principles of this decision is that not every violation of internal order can automatically result in the most severe consequence—the termination of access to higher education.

Sanctions cannot be applied mechanically

Legal relationships related to education, residence in a dormitory, and internal discipline may be interconnected. But they are not identical. They have different subjects, different legal natures, and different permissible consequences of a violation.

This leads to a fundamental conclusion: sanctions cannot be transferred from one set of legal relationships to another automatically, mechanically, and solely for reasons of administrative convenience. It is precisely this kind of mechanism that is dangerous, as it gradually replaces the constitutional substance of the law with disciplinary or organizational logic.

In essence, the Constitutional Court in this case restored a sense of legal proportion to the application of the law. And this is extremely important. Because the loss of such a sense almost always begins with small things: with a formally correct reference to a norm, with a technically logical but substantively dangerous interpretation, with a gradual shift of emphasis from human rights to institutional convenience. Ultimately, this creates a situation where a minor or disciplinary violation begins to cost a person access to a constitutional right. It is precisely against such “shifts” that constitutional justice is meant to protect.

The decision in the Paderin case is an example of precisely such protection. Its strength lies not in the grandness of its wording, but in the precision of its constitutional intervention. The court does not dismantle the legislative framework unnecessarily, but nor does it allow it to be used in violation of the Constitution. This is a sign of legal maturity. After all, true constitutional review is not always about repeal. Very often, it is about setting boundaries. About that line beyond which what begins is no longer the interpretation of the law, but the narrowing of rights.

A decision important not only for education

This decision is not just about the university. In fact, it concerns the general principle of interaction between an individual and any public institution: no organizational logic can override the constitutional status of a person.

It also applies to other areas where institutions may be inclined to justify excessive interference with human rights by citing a contract, order, discipline, or internal regulations.

The Constitutional Court effectively reminded us: where institutional expediency stands on one side and constitutional rights on the other, any restriction must be not only formally possible but also substantively justified, appropriate, and proportionate.

Another feature that makes this decision significant is that the Court does not substitute itself for the legislature. It does not attempt to draft a new provision in place of Parliament. Instead, it does something else—and perhaps something of greater strategic importance: it demonstrates how the existing provision should exist within the constitutional framework.

For the legal system, this is often more valuable than the immediate effect of declaring a provision unconstitutional. Because such a position affects not only the specific case but also the very style of future law enforcement.

Conclusion

The decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated March 11, 2026, is a decision on the limits of a contract, the limits of autonomy, and the limits of institutional discretion. It is a decision on where an institution’s right to order ends and the state’s duty to protect the individual begins. It is about the fact that the right to education cannot be subordinated to convenient administrative logic, and that a formal contractual structure does not nullify a person’s constitutional status. And ultimately—it is about the fact that the power of the Constitution manifests itself precisely where it does not allow an organizational rule to become a basis for the loss of a fundamental right.